THE BVENING HEARTHSTONE. Gladly now we gather round it, For the toiling day is done.

And the gray and solemn twilight
Follows down the golden sun; Follows down the golden sun;
badows lengthen on the pavement,
Stalk like giants through the gloom,
Vander past the dusky casement,
Creep around the firelit room.

Draw the curtain—close the shutters Place the slippers by the fire; Though the rude wind loadly mutters, What care we for wind-sprite's ire?

What care we for white spire.

What care we for ontward seeming?
Fickle Fortune's frown or smile?
If around us Love is beaming—
Love can human ills beguile?

Neath the cottage roof and palace,
From the peasant to the king—
All are quaffing from Life's chalice
Bubbles that enchantment bring,
Grates are glowing—music flewing. Grates are glowing—music flewing
From the lips we love the best;
O, the joy, the bliss, of knowing
There are hearts whereon to rest; Hearts that throb with eager gladness-

Hearts that throb with eager gladness—
Hearts that echo to our own—
While grim Care and haunting Sadness
Mingle ne'er in look or tone.
Gare may tread the halls of Daylight—
Sadness haunt the midnight hour—
But the weird and witching Twilight
Brings the glowing Hearthstone's dower.
Altar of our holiest feelings!
Chilhood's well-remembered shrine!
Spirit yearnings—soul-revealings—
Wreaths immortal round thee twine!

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

BOWEN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY. THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AP-PLIED TO THE CONDITION, RESOURCES AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, By Francis Bowen. 1 vol. 840., 546 pp. Boston: Little,

The pretace to this work informs us that the volume "contains the substance of a course of lectures upon Political Economy delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston." Along with these lectures we also have "all that was deemed worthy of preservation in a series of articles upon various topics in the science, which have been published at various times in The North American Review," the author, as he says, not having deemed it necessary to rewrite what was at first carefully prepared for publication when time and further reflection had not suggested any change of doctrine or any material improvements in illustration or phrasoclogy.

It may be that such a mode of preparing a treatise upon a scientific subject has its advantages, though we fail to discover them; but compactness, unity, and depth are certainly not among the merite, such as they are, of Mr. Bowen's book. Indeed, its chief merit, so far as we can discover, is its audacity; and we hope that nobedy but its auther can boast of the pluck or the self-conceit necessary to offer to the public a volume of six hundred cotavo pages, upon a weighty matter like this. made up of such a lot of heterogeneous and superficial essays. There is, however, another merit, namely, that the world is fully advertised of the nature of the article; the preface at once tells us that here we are furnished with a book eminently wanting in scientific method, close logic, and severe demand upon the attention and reasoning faculty. This, at least, is honest. We are led to expect nothing more than we get. The man who voluntarily buys the book after the author's express notice that it has been made up in a way which involves the admixture of very little wheat in a very large quantity of chaff, has no right to complain. We are, however, further told that "it was intended to contain a summary of what is most valuable in other treatises upon the subject, so as to form a convenient text-book of instruction in American Colleges." It is in behalf of the ingenuous youth who are to be exposed to having such diet palmed upon them without any special consultation of their own wishes, that we propose to inquire how much of solid nutriment it really contains. The maxim careat emptor does not apply to their case.

It will require but brief quotations to prove that, with Mr. Bowen's views of the scope and method of Political Economy, it is impossible for him to produce a really scientific work, and that in coltecting a number of popular lectures and essays he is doing all that the subject in his hands admits. The problem of Economy is thus stated: "On you give the figures, in a series diminishing by a what principles do men readily exchange these articles (these things whether material or immaterial which are objects of frequent barter and sale,) for each other, and what motives, what genera laws regulate their production, distribution and consumption? Political Economy undertakes to answer this question, and is therefore, properly considered, one of the moral sciences." Again, in another place: "The subject to be discussed in this volume will be the general well-being of society, so far as this is effected by the moral causes regulating the product on, distribution and consumption

of wealth. Now we take it the most general conception of the purpose of political economy will be admitted to be the examination of the reciprocal action of associated men, and of their material environmentor physical nature-upon each other, in relation to human well being. The one, physical nature, acts and is acted upon in accordance with laws which are infallibly uniform and unvarying, which have been ascertained in great part with absolute certainty and precision, and which, therefore, conduct not to opinions but to positive knowledge. So far, moreover, as these laws have not yet been ascertained, we have the assurance of a well defined method of inquiry and a constant progress of acquisition in the past, that they are sure to be brought within the domain of positive science at no distant period. On the other hand, as relates to man, we know but this; that of his metaphysical constitution the philosophers of twenty-three centarice ago positively kness quite as much as is known to-day; that whatever was the subject of dispute then is equally unsettled now; and that no agreement has been reached as to the methods through which the controversy is to be determined. In regard to what Mr. Bowen means by Moral Science, the case is little different. Indeed, so far as relates to the more practical departments of motive and character, there is none of the professed doctors who can be pamed with Shakespeare for ineight and knowledge-nor is there any prospect of a more profound or true analysis of the matter. Of course, we here exclude Phrenology and its contributions, real or supposed, for this is founded upon and proceeds by the methods of physical science. and is nought with the doctors of moral philosophy. The question is, then, if we desire to construct a

science in a field of investigation lapping upon physics on the one hand, which is altogether scientific and upon human nature on the other, which as yet earnot be included within the scientific category, at which end are we to begin? At the known, the measurable and ponderable external nature? or at the unknown, the invisible, the mysterious, the fluctuating, internal nature? Given your nut to erack, and wanting to know how the kernel will be affected, will you strike the shell with the hammer in the old mechanical way, or will you sit

down and reflect upon the ultimate purposes of Providence in the deposition of the meat from the sap, and the manner in which it ought to be affected by the cracking of the shell in promotion of a man's desire to eat? The economists of Europe have universally adopted the second of these alternatives. One of the ablest of them, Mr. Mill, regards it as the essence of their method and doctrine. "Political economy," he declares, "ressone from assumed premises-from premises which might be totally without foundation in fact, and which are not pretended to be universally in accordance with it." He turns his back deliberately upon Bacon, Whewell, Herschel and Comte, and abjures the casons of investigation upon which the positive sciences have made their way from the delusions of astrology to that power of prediction which enabled the modern astronomers to say: "Look on a given night and in a certain direction, and you will find Le Verrier's planet, though no human eye has ever seen it;" from the dreams of alchemy to the brilliant certainties of chemistry; from augury making divinations from thunder on the right hand or the left, to electricity and Morse's telegraph. Mr. Bowen follows and approves, and call the product of such labors science.

Our Cambridge professor has, moreover, the superlative impudence to declare that in this way, and in the work under review, he has " endeavored to lay the foundation of an American system of Political Economy"-coolly ignoring the fact that there is an American school whose distinction it is to have pursued the opposite method; to have started from facts, and not from assumptions; to have made Europe ring with the consequent explosion of dogmas long undoubtingly accepted by its leading economists. There is not a word in his book to show that he ever heard of Carey, though his system is taught alike in sunny Turin and bleak Upsals, has awakened a responsive echo from torpid Oxford, and is discussed when not accepted by every professor of any considerable reading or repute in France and Germany. Is this affectation or ignorance? Whichever it may be, the result is a blank failure to produce an American system; and, in its stead, a ustchwork adaptation of the European system to American circumstances-by a little paring in one place and a little elongation in another; by qualifications timidly reaching toward a doubt, seldom or never amounting to a denial. It is the attempt to put new wine into old bottles-the familiar effort of trimmers and compromisers to serve God upon such principles and in such fashion as to give the Devil no solid ground for offense.

Let us take for example the way in which Mr. Bowen deals with the theories of Malthus and Ricarde. And here we are called upon to observe that they are not only inextricably connected, so that one must stand or fall with the other, but that if founded in fact they are true examples of a genuine method, and conduct to clear, uniform and irreversible laws, from which we may reason deductively with the same undeniable certainty as from the propositions of geometry. The central falsehood of the Ricardian hypothesis came from the Moral Philosophy side-from speculating upon what man on the principles of human nature would probably like to do-not from inquiring what the physical constitution of the world left it in his power to do, or from observing historically what he had in fact done, or seegraphically what he is now doing. But if it be true in point of fact that men, in the occupation and cultivation of the earth, begin with the best soils and the best situations, and proceed as they are driven by the growth of population to those inferior in fertility and location, it then follows inexorably that if population increases the progress of the race must be a steady declension toward destitution, misery and vice-that rent must continusly absorb more and more from profits and wages-that the inequality of wealth and power must be progressively exaggerated, and feudal aristocracy established more firmly as its grinding force increases and the power of resistance is exhausted. If it be so, population must tend to outrun subsistence. The rate is immaterial; whether fixed law, one value or another, the final result nothing distinctive. But if the fact is the reverse or that imagined by Ricardo, consequences directly the contrary follow, and the progress of mankind toward well-being, equality, and democracy, is not a vegue hope, but an abiding law.

Mr. Bowen states "the two great facts which constitute a complete refutation of Malthusianism"

The first is that the limit of population in any country whatever is not the number of people which the soil of that country alone will supply with food, but the number which the surface of the whole earth is capable of feeding, and it is a matter of demonstra-tion that this limit caunot even be approached for many centuries. Lordon taxes all the

from that this finite cannot even be approximate for many centuries.

Lordon taxes all the countries of England for sustenance; England taxes all the countries of the earth for sustenance; I cannot see any difference in the two cases.

Then, secondly, I say that the practical or actual limit to the growth of population in every country is the limit to the increase and distribution not of food but of wealth. Among civilized men in modern times form the country is the state of the countries of th a famine is created not by any absolute deficiency in the supply of food, but because the poorer classes have no money to buy it with. As every human being is an implement for the production of wealth, a means of enlarging the aggregate national product or the appears of enlarging the supplement of a release. amount of exchangeable values belonging to a nation, the increase of population is not a cause of scarcity of food but a preservative against it. It makes no difference whether the mass of the people are engaged in hammering iron, spinning cotton, or raising wheat; for the product in each of these cases either is food, or is exchangeable for food, which amounts to precisely the

This is a mere dodging of the question, for Malthusiavism has anticipated and answered the pretended refutation. As to the first "great fact," it is apparent that the ability of England to draw sustenance from any other country depends upon the ability of that country to raise a surplus after feeding its own people. That surplus either dwindles with the increase of population in the food-producing country, or its population is kept down by the increasing difficulty, present and prospective, of obtaining food, or by sickness, war, moral restraint" or some other of the Malthusian checks. Upon either hypothesis the validity of Malthus's doctrine is injact.

So as to the second "great fact." Paople must have food before they can hammer iron or spin cotton. Whether domestic or imported, the ratio of the supply to the number of consumers, both foreign and domestic, keeps diminishing and its price in money or in labor, therefore, increasing, The more people hammer iron and spin cotton the more cotton and iron must they offer for a given quantity of food. The proportion of their labor expended directly or indirectly in supplying the primary necessity increases. Mr. Bowen still clings to enough of the system of Malthus and Ricardo to preclude him from impeaching this argument, for he states the result for our own country thus:

So long as land continues abundant and cheap, and the wages of labor high, so long the population will continue to increase with great rapidity. Barbarous tribes will die out before its advancing wave, and the desert will be peopled. But as the country files

up and the wages of labor fall, it will become more difficult to rise from one class of society to another, and the rate of increase will diminish.

The tendency of wages to fall with the growth of population is the very essence, the worst practical dogma, of the system he pretends to discard and assumes to refute. It is impossible otherwise than by its aid to make the show of an argument for any such tendency. The facts of history abundantly repel it as an empirical conclusion, and the real American system of Political Economy, which Mr. Bowen has never heard of, establishes a law directly the contrary. It proves from incontrovertible laws of vegetable chemistry and physiciogy that increasing density of population promotes the relative increase, not only of wealth generally. but specifically of food and raw materials; and it also proves that not only does production in the normal course of nature grow more rapidly than population, but that of the increased mass of products-as it would be if they were equally divided -as increasing proportion is won by the laborer for wages. Contrast the last quoted passage from Mr. Bowen with the following:

Mr. Bowen with the following:

Whatever tends to keep men hopelessly poor is a direct encoursgement—the strongest of all incentives to an increase of population.

It is not the excess of population which causes the misery, but the

Perhaps he can establish a distinction between low wages, which are to diminish the rate of American increase, and misery, which would accelerate it. If not, his argument is a humiliating example of the shifts to which a man is driven by the sham of rejecting a theory while adhering to the mode of reasoning and the most vital consequences which ettend it. The growth of population promotes a greater relative growth of subsistence, or produces a diminishing relative growth, or the phenomens have no connection. One of these propositions must be true: but Mr. Bowen's pupils will find it very hard to discover which of them, if either, he really believes.

Mr. Bowen's treatment of the subject of rent or the value of land is unsatisfactory, though not perhaps to the same extent as his discussion of the topic of population. He very correctly maint sins "that the natural fertility of what Ricardo calls the original and inherent powers of the soil as an element of rent are wholly insignificant in comparison with nearness to market." He treats it, however, empirically without seeking the ultimate law on which the fact rests, and therefore without determining the degree of its importance and the limits within which the observation holds good, or producing that clear conviction which can only flow from understanding the reason of a rule. He holds that so much of Ricardo's doctrine " that land bears rent in proportion to its nearness to the place where agricultural produce is needed and consumed; and that the increase of population is an evil because the community are obliged to send further and further off for their supplies," is obviously fallacious, as involving the supposition "that the population as it increases remains stationary or on the same spot, so that the grain must be brought to it at a price enhanced by the cost of transportation." His answer is, that "instead of the food coming from a distance to the population, the population go to the food." The italies are his own. We do not see that this helps the matter very much, for, waiving the question whether the statement of Ricardo's difficulty is a correct one, the objection remains that at the place to which they may remove the same amount of food is to be obtained only by the expenditure of labor greater to some extent, large or small; and that with the progress of population all such places will be found already occupied. Mr. Bowen, however, states a theory of rent to which our objection is, not that it is not sound so far as it goes, but that it is incomplete; that he has not adequately proved it, and that it is continually set forth and supported in terms which relate to price or money valuation, and not to the quantity of the products and their cost in labor. This is, that "it arises from the excess of the local demand over the local supply, and is therefore ultimately regulated by the expense and inconvenience of bringing food from a distance, or by the discomforts and privations which attend the removal of a portion of the people to a new ome." This becomes very simple when we reverse the hypothesis of Ricardo, as is done by the true American system of Political Economy, and substitute the fact that men are compelled by their weakness to begin with the cultivation of the poor soils. and pass, with the acquisition of power through the increase of population and of associated effort, to the richer. The doctrine gains as much in effectiveness as it does in facility and cogency of demonstration. Mr. Bowen applies his doctrine to the support of the policy of protection, and thus gives practical utility to his difference with Ricardo; but with vastly less force than the acceptance of the complete truth would have given him. The grand prevailing imperfection of his book is that it is throughout negative and critical merely, not constructive. He has added nothing to the European system, and has eliminated its error but very par-

tially and feebly. In discussing profits he fails to distinguish between rate and quantity, and tells us that "a diminished rate of profit tends to throw the great branches of manufacture and commerce exclusively into the hands of large capitalists, and thus to increase that inequality in the distribution of wealth which was one of the original causes of a fall of profits." The American school proves most conclusively that the declension of the rate of profit attends and accelerates increasing quality in the distribution of wealth, but that the aggregate mass of profits increases as the rate delines. Mr. Bowen quotes approvingly the remark of Mr. Leing: "It is in the nature of trade and manufacture that great capital drives small capital out of the field; it cannot afford to work for maller returns." Both miss the true explanation. The wages of management are less in propertion as the capital is increased, and greater returns are secured by increasing the number of transactions in a higher ratio than the proportion of profit in each is decreased. Whether it is in the making of shoes or the carrying of railway passengers, low prices and cheap fares extend the market so that by the same capital and in the same time more than a million five cent profits are secured where less than half a million ten cent ones could have been. The great capital does not drive small capital out of the field, but only drives it to associ-

The chapter in which Mr. Bowen applies Mill's theory of International Exchange to the vindication of the protective system is the best in the book, because its argument is disconnected from the unsatisfactory theories of Population and Rent which infect the most of his discussions. For the same reason the chapters on Money, Banks, and Commercial Crises, are much better than those on the leading heads of Wages and Profits. Our space does not permit any criticism of them, even to the limited extent we have employed on the Ulm.

earlier chapters. The book is rather readable. Its defects as a text book rather contribute to that merit. If originally prepared for popular reading and hearing, it would be strange if it had the qualities to be sought in a manual for instruction. For this purpose it is superior to the trashy book of Dr. Wayland, which is very extensively used-requiring no exercise of brain on the part of either teacher or pupil. So far as it may take the place of that, it will do a real service, for which we shall be duly grateful.

NAPOLEON I. DELINEATED BY HIMSELF. THE CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF NAPO-LEON BONAPARTE WITH HIS BROTHER JO-SEPH, SOMETIME KING OF SPAIN. 2 vols. 12mo-New York: D. Appleton & Co.

When Joseph Bonaparte left his retreat in Switzerland to take a share in the drama of the hundred days, which ended in Napoleon's second abdication and imprisonment at St. Helens, he buried in a wood a collection of letters and papers, of which the most valuable part was his correspondence with his brother, the Emperor. These papers were afterward recovered, and carried to America. Joseph left them by his will to one of his grandsens, born of the marriage of his daughter to the distinguished naturalist, the eldest son of Lucien Bonaparte. Till this young man came of age these papers, after Joseph's death, remained some time for safe keeping in the Mint at Philadelphia. They have since been published at Paris in the Memoirs du Roi Joseph, in eleven volumes, of which the first appeared in 1852 and the last in 1855,

The editor of the publication of which the title stands at the head of this paper, has selected from that work the letters of Napoleon himself, which, with a few others, he has translated and publishedpreserving, in an arrangement of them into chapters, the same order and division in which they were originally published, as illustrative of so many chapters of Joseph's life.

The letters written previous to Napoleon's assumption of the imperial title are few and short, though several of them are highly curious. After that period, the correspondence between the brothers became very full, and contain altogether the most authentic and frank exposition of Napoleon's imperial policy which has anywhere appeared. Many of them, particularly those written after the transfer of Joseph to Spain, are filled with minute, and to the non-military reader rather dry military instructions for the prosection of the war, in which Napoleon acted throughout as a principal, not only himself perpetually rebuking Joseph, but even allowing his Ministers to do it-Joseph, even while nominally King of Naples and Spain, being still in his character of commander of a French army, held accountable to the imperial Ministry of War. Yet amid this mass of details Napolcon displays, in clear and distinct outlines, himself and that whole system of imperial policy which made him for ten years the dread and terror of the civilized world, and ended with sending him to pine and perish on the rock of St. Helena.

Referring in one of these letters to one of his generals in Spain (who in a report of a defeat had attempted to conceal his losses) he bids him be told, I approve of his putting what he likes in the newspapers, but when he writes to me I must have the truth." So in another letter toward the very close of his career-boasting of the terror with which his maneuvers and victories had inspired Schwartzenberg and the allied sovereigns, who gave him eredit for a vast many more troops than he hadhe says to Joseph: " See what is the effect of terrer. The Parisian newspapers must confirm their fears; newspapers are not history any more than builtins are history; one should always persuade the enemy that oves forces are immense." Now almost everything we have of Napoleon's except these etters, including his talk at St. Helena, is of the nature of bulletins and newspaper publications intended to deceive the enemy and to play upon the imagination of friends. In these letters he is infinitely more sincere. As he had undertaken to cake a tyrant of his good-natured brother, he judged it expedient to let him know precisely what it was he must be willing to do if he desired to keep himself in the position he had assumed as king by conquest of Naples and of Spain. The centrast of character between Napoleon and Joseph s most strikingly exhibited in a letter of the former written only fifteen days before the entry of the allies into Paris and the end of Napoleon's rule That letter is in these terms:

"Reanes, March 14, 1814.—If it suited me to remove the Duke of Canegliano (Marshal Moncey), all the idle talk of Paris would have no effect. The National Guard of Paris is a part of the people of France, and as long as I lice, I will be master everywhere in France. Your character is opposed to mine; you like to flotter people and to yield to their wishes; I like them to try to please me and to obey my wishes. I am as much a sovereign now as I was at Austeristz. Do not require any person to flatter the National Guard, nor permit any person to flatter the National Gnard, nor Regnard nor any one else to set himself up as their tribune. I suppose, however, that they see there is some difference between the time of La Fayette, when the people ruled, and the present time when I rule."

Joseph was naturally a good-hearted, rather sain man, of no very penetrative judgment, who, out a pardonable confidence in his own good intentions and inclination to be a good and indulgent prince, suffered himself to be mixed up with, and to e placed cominally at the head of a system of robbery and bleed, of which, before it was finished, nobody was sicker than himself.

For the benefit of those whom the dry husks in

which the kernel of these letters is wrapped might prevent from getting at the meat-and especially of those whom the Rev. Mr. Abbott's Life of Napoleon may have led to regard the emperor as a perfectly philanthropic and disinterested personage, exclusively devoted to the good of the human race,-we have been at the pains to select and print under appropriate head a series of extracts, such as will suffice to show in words of his own, Napoleon's real character and the system upon which he acted-which system simply was to replace by a dynasty of his own and by a nobility created and endowed by it and attached to it, the dynasties and nobilities which the French revolution had shaken or overthrown-a project for the execution of which he hesitated at nothing that in his judgment seemed likely to promote its success; and for the sake of which he kept Europe for ten years in continual war and turmoil, in the course of which every capital in it, except London and Constantinople, was occupied by hostile armies, the best part of its energies being absorbed in the most expensive and destructive warfare that the world has ever known. Of the letters contained in this collection, only eighty-four, mostly quite short ones, were written previous to Napoleon's assumption of the imperial title. The great bulk of this correspondence relates to the period subsequent to that event, commencing in September 1805, Joseph baving been left in Paris as Napoleon's representative, when he left that city to march against the combined forces of the Austrians and Russians. Our extracts begin shortly after the capitulation of

Brannow, Oct. 21, 1805.—My BROTHER: I reached Brannau to-day. It snows heavily. The Russias army seems, frightened by the fate of the Austrians. [The capitulation at Ulm.] They have abandoned to me Brannau, one of the keys of Austria, well fortified and full of magazines. We shall see now what the Russian army will do. It has lost its presence of mind. They rob, steal, and outrage everywhere, to the great disgust of the people. They look down on the Austrians, who seem no longer to like fighting; by tacy, I mean the Russian officers; the men are brukes, who de not know an Austrian from a Frenchman. not know an Austrian from a Frenchman.

THE MARSHALL -- ONLY NAPOLEOS TO BOB.

Schönferum, Nov. 15, 1805. -- MY BROTHER: The
bulletin has told you all I found in Vienns. I maneuvered to day against the Russian army, and have not been bulletin has told you all I found in Vienna. Inaneuvered to day against the Russian army, and have not been satisfied with Bernadotte: perhaps the fault is in his health. When I let him enter Munich and Salabourg, and enjoy the glory of these great expeditions without his having to fire a gun or to endure any of the fatiguing services of the army, I had a right to expect that he would want neither activity nor zeal. He had lost me aday, and on a day may depend the destiny of the world. Not a man would have escaped me. I hope that he will repair his fault to-morrow by a more active movement. I want Junot. Every day convinces me more and more that the generals whom I have formed are incomparably the best. I continue to be pleased with Murat, Lannes, Davoust, Soult, Ney and Marmont. I hear nothing of Augereau's march. Massena has behaved indifferently. He made had dispositions and got himself beaten at Caldiero. Prince Charles's army is advancing on me. The Venitian country must by this time be evacuated. It may be well to let him [i. e. Massena] know through our common friends that I am not very well pleased, I will not say with his courage but with the abilities he has shown. This will rouse his zeal and may stop the disorder which is beginning in his army. I know that a contribution of 400,000 francs has been imposed by Massena] on the Austrian portion of Verona. I intend to make the generals and officers who serve me well so rich that they will have no pretext for dishonoring, by their explaity, the noblest of all professions, and losing the respect of their soldiers.

FINASCIAL PRESSURES AND BANK TROUBLES.

FINANCIAL PRESSURES AND BANK TROUBLES Nor. 18, 1805.—All that is going on at the bank has een long foreseen by sensible people. The principa-nuse is, that they discount every species of paper in circulation; but the root of all this evil is that the in-terest of most of the directors is opposed to that of the public and of the State. I see little change of finding a

emedy.

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITE. THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

Austerlitz, Dec. 3, 1805.—After some days of maneuvers I had yesterday a decisive battle. I put to flight the aliled army commanded by the two Emperors of Germany and Russia in person. It somisted of 80,000 Russians and 30,000 Austrians. I have taken about 40,000 prisoners, among whom are 90 Russian Generals, 40 ceiers, 200 pieces of cannon, and all the standards of the Russian Imperial Guards. The whole army has crowned itself with clory.

standards of the Russian Imperial Guards. The whole army has crowned itself with glory.

The enemy has left at least from 12,000 to 15,000 men on the Sild. I do not yet know my own loss. I estimate it at 800 or 900 killed and twice as many wounded. A whole column of the enemy threw itself into a lake, and the greater part of them were drowned. I farey that I still hear the cry of those wretches whom it was impossible to save. The two Emperors are in a bad situation. You may print the substance of this, but not as extracted from a letter of mine. It would not be suitable.

(This reference to those drowned at Australity is This reference to those drowned at Austerlitz is

highly characteristic. He evidently intended to give Joseph, and through him Paris and France. the impression that he would have saved them is he could. The fact is thus stated by Thiers in his History of the Consulate and the Empire: "The " flying Russians threw themselves on the frozen lakes. The ice gave way in some places, but was firm in others, and afforded an asylum to a crowd of fugitives. Napoleon from the hill of Pratzen, overlooking the lakes, saw the disaster.

He ordered the battery of his guard to fire round

shot on the parts of the ice which remained unbroken, and thus, to complete the destruction of the wretches who had taken refuge there. Near 2,000 persons were thus drowned among the " broken ice."

SAPOLEON'S CONTEMPT FOR THE OPINION OF PARIS.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 15, 1805.—I am not accustomed to let my policy be governed by the gossip of Paris, and I am some that you attach so much importance to it [Joseph had written that Paris, suffering under the senetary crisis alluded to in the preceding extract was anxious for peace]. My people, under all circumstances, have found it good to trust everything to me, and the present question is too complicated to be understood by a Parisian citizen.

I shall make peace when I think it the interest of my people to do set and the outeries of a few intriguess will not lasten or delay it by a single hour. My people will always be phrased when it knows that I am, because that pieves that its interests have been protected. The time when it deliberated in its sections has passed. APOLEON'S CONTEMPT FOR THE OPINION OF PARIS. hen it deliberated in its sections has passed.

STEATING BY WHOLESALE.

Munich, Dec. 31, 1855.—Mr BROTHER: I am at unich. I shall remain here a few days to receive the titleation of the treaty; and to give to the army its

torders. Lestend to take possession of the Kingdom of Naples. Marshell Mussena and General Saint Cyr are marching on that kingdom with two corps d'armée. I have named you my Lieutenant commanding in chief the army of Naples.

Set off for home forty hours after the receipt of this letter, and let your first dispatch inform me that you have entered. Naples, driven out the traiterous court. nd subjected that part of Italy to your authority. You will find at the headquarters of the army ecrees and instructions relating to your mission.

You will wear the uniform of a General of Division As my Lieutenant, you will have all the Marshals under your orders. Your command does not extend beyond the army of the Neapolitan territory. * * Do not say whither you are going, except to the A-ch-Chancellor; let it be known only by your letters from the army.

the army.

How General's are to be Managed.

Munich, Jan. 12, 1806.—I calculate that after a few days' rest you will have near 40,000 men, which you can divide into three corps; Massena will have the largest, General Saint Cyr the second, and General Reyneir the smallest, consisting of 6,000 good troops, as a reserve. Attach yourself to General Reyneir. He is cold, but of the three he is best able to make a good plan of campaign and to give you good advice. In your position the secret is to make each of the three believe that he has your confidence. NO STEALING EXCEPT BY NAPOLEON RIMSELF.

(Same letter.)—Talk seriously to Massena and to S—, and say that you will have no stealing. Massena bas been rebbing terribly in the Venetian country. I have recalled S— to Paris on the same ground. He NO PLINCHING-JOSEPH PROMISED A SHARE OF THE

CHESCHES CHESCHES A SHARE OF THE CHESCHES.

Stuttgardt, Jan. 19. 1806.—My BROTHER: I wish you to enter the kingdom of Naples in the first days of February, and I wish to hear from you in the course of February that february, and I wan to hear from you in the course of Felenary that our flag is flying on the walls of that apitot. You will make no truce you will hear of no apitulation: my will is that the Bourbons shall have weared to reign at Najec. I intend to seal on that throne a prince of my own house. In the first place, you if it suits you; if not, another.

HOW NAPLES IS TO BE SEIZED, AND AT WHOLE ZX

(Some letter.)—I repeat it, do not divide your forces; let your army pass the Appenines, and let your three cops march on Naples, so disposed as to be able to ion in one day on one dof battle. Leave a general, n in one day on one some depots, some stores, and some artille. Ancona for its defense. Naples once taken ant parts of the kingdom will fall of themselves. my in the Abruzzi will be taken in the rear, u will send a division to Taranto, and anothe id Sicily to conquer that kingdom. I intend to leave under your orders in the kingdom of Naples al this year and afterward, until I make some new dispohis year and afterward, until I make some action, fourteen regiments of French infantry and welve regiments of French cavalry on a full war the country must find provisions. establishment. The country must find provisions clothes, remaints, and all that is necessary for your army, so that it may not cost me a farthing.

Paris, Jan. 27, 1806.—My Brother: I reached Paris yesterday evening. I am delighted with everything you did while you were at Paris. Receive my best thanks, and as a proof of how well I am picased, I shall send you by the first messenger my portrait on a snaff box.

NO HALF MEASURES—NO WEARNESS. Paris, Jan. 31, 1806.—It is supposed that the Prince Royal remains in Naples; if so, seize him and send him to France, with a sufficient ane trustworthy esend him to France, which a same a same as the very sound of serion. If any of the great people or others are trooblesome, send there to France and say that rou do it by my order. No half measures, no weakness. I intend my blood to reign in Naples as long as it does in France: the kingdom of Naples is necessary to me.

BE MASTER-ROBBING AN EXCLUSIVE ROTAL RIGHT. 1806 .- I am surprised at the bad state of your artillery, and at your general want of supplies. This comes of generals who think only of robbing; keeps strict hand over them. . . When you cuter Naples proclaim that you will suffer so

private contributions to be raised, that the whole will be rewarded, and that it is not right that only a few individuals should be enriched by the exercise of all.

of all.

Do not lose a day or an gour to be seize Sicily, many things will be easy in the ment, and difficult afterward.

When you have taken Naples, and all look I will communicate to you my plans for gott awhowled King of Naples. INFERIAL NETHOD OF COLLECTING DESTS, &

PRETENDED—WHAT ROGUES MEN ARE.

(Same letter.)—I am well pleased with my bere. It gave me great trouble to bring them to order, and to force a dezen rogues, at whose he Ouvrard, to refued. I had made up my mad to them shot without trial. Thank God I have been read. The has rest me somewhat them shot without trial. Thank God I have been is paid. This has put me somewhat out of humor tell you about it that you may see how dishonest measure. You, who are now at the head of a great army and will soon be at that of a great administration, ought to be aware of this. Roguery has been the cause of all the misfortunes of France.

THE FIRST OF WANTS FOR A USURPER.

(Same letter.)—I take the greatest interest in ye_
prosperity, and particularly in your glory; in your pesition it is the first of wants, without it life can have napoleon's payonite reading

Paris, Feb. 9, 1806.—The return which yos have sent me is not clear. I do not see the position of Gon. Gardanne's division, nor his force. Let Cæsar Berthier take the trouble to give me regriar returns, with the artillery, horses, &c., and not mere results, which tell nothing. The returns of my armies form the most agreeable portion of my library. They are the columns which I read with the greatest pleasure in my moments of relaxation.

noments of relaxation.

I see already in those which you have sent to me traces of the disorder which Massens produces everytraces of the disorder which Massens produces every-where. I see companies that do not properly belong to the army of Naples. This cardesaness will at last derange the administration of the army and destroy its discipline.

derange the administration of the army and destroy to discipline. Send me perfectly accurate returns.

Aug. 20, 1806.—Take pleasure, if you can, in reading your returns. The good condition of my armies is owing to my devoting to them two or three hours in every day. When the mouthly returns of my armies and of my fleets, which form twenty thick volumes, are set to me. I care to give me avery other occuration in order to my ficets, which form twenty thick volumes, are sent to me. I give up every other occupation in order to read them in detail, and to observe the difference between one monthly return and another. No young gat enjoys her novel so much as I do these returns.

The indication here given of Napoleon's attention to the exact details of his army is amply borne out in the sequel. No miserly merchant ever showed more exact attention to the pence and farthings, or exhibited more complete knowledge of the state of his ledger, than Napoleon does as to his men, horses, equipments and the minute details as well as the totality of his force.

The folding of his force.

The family name dropped.

Paris, Feb. 8.—Caution is no longer necessary.
You are already master of Naples, and on the point of taking Sicily by surprise; this is your chief aim. The Neapolitan arrangements are already approved by Prussia. You should entitle your acts "Joseph Napoleon:" you need not add Bonaparte.

serves Last consideration.

KINGCRAFT.

(Same letter.)—I congratulate you upon your reconciliation with St. Januarius. [Joseph had presented
St. Januarius with a diamond necklace.] But I suppose that, notwithstanding this, you have occupied
the forts; that you have taken care to garrison ask
provision them, that you have disarmed the town,
and been rather severe in your government. Many
things belonging to the palaces have been removed and
concealed. You ought to get them restored. Disarm
the population; send away all strangers—the Russians,
the English, and even the Italians who are not Neapel
Haus. Make your army rich, but do not let them rob.

Hans. Make your army rich, but to THIEVES AND ROBBERS.

Paris, March 2, 1806.—Dismiss Sibille, he is a thief. Massens has robbed wherever he could. Let thef. Masseen has robbed wherever he could, whim he advised to return three millions. Salisetti will do this for you. Let him see Massena and tell him that S— has formally admitted that Massena received three millions as a gift; that if they are not returned in the accounts which I shall publish in May of the octarbutions levied by the army, I shall debit him with this sum, and add the proofs and name a commission of seven officers to oblige him to restore it; it is a very serious matter.

erious matter. MORE KINGCRAFT. (Same letter.)—You are too cautious. Naples can well give you four or five millions. Announce my speedy errival at Naples. It is so far off that I do not care to premise you that I shall go, but there is no barm in announcing it, both for the sake of the army

barm in announcing it, both for the and the people.

Your troubles are what always occur. Never go out without guards.

In all your calculations assume this: that a fortinght sconer or a fortinght later you will have an insurrection. It is an event of uniform occurrence in a conquered country.

Whatever you do the mere force of opinion [Joseph had written—"This town appears to me more populous than Paris. I can maintain my position only by the assistance of public opinion"] will not maintain you in a city like Naples. Take care that populous than Paris. I can maintain my position only by the assistance of public opinion' I will not maintain you in a city like Naples. Take care that there are mortars in the forts and troops in reserve to in insurrection. Disirm, and do

punish speedily an insurrection. Disum, and do it quickly. I presume that you have cannon in your palaces, and take all poper precautions for your safety. You canno watch too na rowly those about you. The presumption and care a sness of the French is unequaled.

All the troubles under which you are suffering belong to your position. Disarm, dearm, keep order in that immense city. Keep your artillery in positions waste the mob cannot seize them. Reckon on a riot or a small insurrection. I wish that I could give you the benefit of my experience in these matters. BLEED! SQUEEZE! STRIKE TERROR! PAY YOUR Paris, March 6, 1806.—Let the lazzaroni who use

Paris, March 6, 1806.—Let the lazzaroni who use the dagger be shot without mercy. It is only by a salutary terror that you will keep in awe an Italian populace. The least that the conquest of Naples must do for you is to afford supplies to your army of forty thousand men. Lay a contribution of thirty millions on the whole Kingdom. Your conduct wants decision. Your soldiers and your generals ought to live in pleasy. Of course, you will call together the pricets and deciare then responsible for any disorder. The lazaroni must have chiefs; they must answer for the rest Whatever you do, you will have an insurrection. Whatever you do, you will have an insurrection.

Disarm. You sey nothing about the forts. If necessary, do as I did in Cairo: prepare three or four batteries, whose shells shall reach every part of Naples. You may not use them, but their mere existence strike terror. The Kingdom of Naples is not exhaus You can always get money; since there are royal field and taxes which have been given away. Every aller ation of the royal domains or of the taxes—though its existence may be immemorial—must be annulled, and a system of taxation, equal and severe, must be and a system of taxation, equation severe, mass established. . You have no money, but you have a good army and a good country to supply you have a good army and a good country to supply you mustificiency of your military force. Two regiments of cavalry, two bettalions of light infantry, and a company of artillery, would put to flight all the mob of Naples. But the first of all things is to have upone and you of artillery, would put to flight all the mob of Naples. But the first of all things is to have money, and you can get it only in Neples. A contribution of thirty millions well provide for everything, and put you a your ease. Tell me something about the forts. I presume that they command the town, and that you have put provisional commandants into them. You must set about organizing a Gendarmerie. You feel, an entering Naples is richer than Vienna, and not so exhausted. Milan itself, when I entered it, had not a farteling. Once more, expect no money from me. not so exhausted. Mitan itself, when I entered it, has not a farteling. Once more, expect no money from me. The five hundred thousand francs in gold, which I sent to you, are the last I shall send to Naples. I our not so much about three or four millions, as about the principle. Raise thirty millions, pay your army, treat well your generals and commanders, put your army, treat well your generals and commanders, put your army.

PURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN TYRANST.

Paris, March 8, 1896.—My BROTHER: I see that by
sue of your processions you promise to impose as
war contribution, and that you forbid your soldiers to war contribution, and that you forbid your soldiers to require those who lodge them to feed them. It seems to me that your measures are too narrow. It is not by being civil to people that you obtain a hold on tiem. This is not the way to get the means to reward your army properly. Raise thirty millions from the Kingdom of Naples. Pay well your army; remount your evairy and your trains; have shoes and clother made. This cannot be done without money. As for me, it would be too absurd if the conquest of Naples did not put my army at its case. It is impossible that you should keep within the bounds that you profess. I do not hear that you have shot any of the laxistroni, although i know that they have used their dangers. If you do not begin by making yourself feared,

gers. If you do not begin by making yourself feared, you will suffer for it. The imposition of a land tax will not produce the effect which you apprehend, everybody expects it, and will think it quite astural. At Vienua, where there was supposed not to be a